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THE MARKET FOR "LAW-AND" SCHOLARSHIP
ROBERT C. ELUCKSON* -
It is fitting to begin by recounting an important episode in the
history of "law-and" scholarship. The year was 1933. The United
States was mired in the Great Depression. Recognizing that the
country was facing problems-massive problems-a group of
energetic and idealistic law professors conceived the idea of
starting a new law journal. In the 1990s, this hardly seems an
original idea. In the 1930s, it was. The envisioned journal would
be pioneering in two respects, one procedural, one substantive.
First, contrary to the custom then prevailing within law schools,
thejournal would be edited by professors, not students. Second,
consistent with the Legal Realist movement of the 1930s, the
promoters of the journal would venture beyond doctrinal
analysis. For each issue they would choose a symposium topic
and solicit interdisciplinary perspectives on it. They proposed to
tap as authors not only law professors and practicing lawyers, but
also experts unblessed by legal training. The journal's promoters
anticipated that this "law-and" strategy (not their phrase) would
foster the cross-fertilization of ideas.
As the attendees of this Symposium may have guessed, the law
school in question was the Duke University Law School, where
the Symposium was held. The journal was Law and Contemporary
Problems. The journal's key promoter was a youthfil Duke law
professor, David Cavers. He was aided by a committee of five,
including Lon Fuller, also ajunior member of the Duke faculty
I refer to this episode partly to commemorate the
accomplishments of our host institution. The vignette also will
serve to support my analysis of the market for "law-and"
* Walter E. Meyer Professor of Property and Urban Law, Yale Law School. I thank
Stephanie Stem for research assistance and Fred Shapiro for guidance.
1. The editors outline their ambitions for the journal in Foward 1 L & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 1 (1933). The first issue was devoted to the topic of protecting consumers from
unwholesome food and drugs.
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scholarship, this panel's topic.2 Both David Cavers and Lon
Fuller subsequently accepted invitations to join the faculty of the
Harvard Law School. I will contend that a professor chooses
among scholarly approaches with an eye to maximizing
opportunities to advance to a more prestigious appointment
(such as one at Harvard, at least at that time).
The first portion of the essay marshals statistical evidence that
indicates that social-scientyfk "law-and" approaches are on the
rise. The primary schools in this social-scientific category are law
and economics, law and society, and law and psychology. I
provide no data on trends in the popularity of other "law-and"
perspectives, such as analytical jurisprudence, law and literature,
and feminism. The second portion of the essay briefly analyzes
the market for legal scholarship. I argue that the demand side of
this market significantly constrains any penchants for fluffiness
that the law professors on the supply side may possess.
I. THE RELENTLESS RISE OF LAW-AND-SOCIAL-SCIENCE
SCHOLARSHIP
Citation analysis, despite many limitations, is an objective
method of revealing trends in legal scholarship! The costs of
citation analysis have been plummeting during the latter half of
the Twentieth Century because commercial enterprises have
been providing the necessary data in increasingly accessible
form. The drop in search costs has led to a boom in legal
citology-the empirical study of legal citations. The data
presented below have been culled from two sources: (1) Journals
and Law Reviews (/MR), a Westlaw electronic database; and (2)
the Institute for Scientific Information's Social Sciences Citation
Index (SSCI). The statistics presented are partial findings from a
larger ongoing research project.
The next sections briefly review three strands of evidence
drawn from JLR and SSCI. Each strand supports the thesis that
social-scientific scholarship has steadily become more significant
2. A useful overview of the rise of "law-and" scholarship is Richard A. Posner, The
Decline of Lawa as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HAV. L REV. 761 (1987).
3. For a succinct review of the limitations of citation analysis, see James E. Krier &
stewartJ. Schwab, The Cathedral at TwenV-Trve Citations and Impressions, 106Yale L.J. 2121
(1997).
4. See Symposium on the Trnds in Legal Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI-KENT L. REV.
743,743-1013 (1996).
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in the legal academy. The trend is particularly clear for the
period since 1982, when the JLR data became ample enough to
be usable. However, the upward trend may have begun decades
earlier, perhaps in response to the work of the Legal Realists
and the young David Cavers.
A. Trends in Law Review Citations to Articles in the Flagship Journals
of Various Disciplines
One method of measuring the influence of social science is to
tally law-review citations to journals that publish articles with a
social-scientific bent. Table 1 indicates how often articles
published in selected journals have been cited in lawjournal
articles whose texts appear in Westlaw'sJLR database!
As Table I indicates, during 1982-1996 the Harvard Law Review
and the Yale Law Journal were in a nip-and-tuck race for the
status of the journal most cited by authors of law review articles.
In absolute terms, each was cited more often than all five of the
law-and-social-science journals in Table 1 combined.
Nevertheless, the figures in Table 1 are ominous for the editors
of traditionally prominent student-edited law reviews. The
(deflated) number of citations to the median of the three
student-edited journals actually declined by 3% between 1982-84
and 1994-96. At the same time, the (deflated) number of
citations to the median law-and-social-science journal increased
by 26%, and to the median flagship social-science journal, by
49%. Although regression to the mean may be part of the story,
Table 1 unmistakably supports the thesis that authors of law
review articles increasingly cite social-scientific sources.
B. Trends in the Use of Social-Scientfic Terms in Law Review Articles
A word or phrase can serve as a proxy for a form of legal
analysis. Table 2 shows results of searches for particular words
and phrases in articles included in Westlaw's JLR database since
1982 .
5. The number of articles in this database increased about fourfold between 1982 and
1996. To control for distortions that might result from variations in database size, I
computed a 'deflator" index and used it to adjust upward the numbers appearing in
both the 1982-84 and 1988-90 columns of Table 1.
6. Again, because the JLR database swelled steadily during 1982-96, the entries in the
1982-84 and 1988-90 columns have been adjusted upward by applying a deflator index.
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TABLE 1
TREND IN THE NUMBER OF LAW-REVIEW CITATIONS




1982-84 1988-90 1994-96 1994-96
Selected student-edited law journals
Harvard Law Review 8488 9212 8594 +1%
Yale LawJournal 8872 7657 7445 -16%
Columbia Law Review 5664 5975 5485 -3%
[median % change] [-3%]
Selected law-and-social-science journals
Journal of Legal Studies 1570 1485 1809 +15%
Journal of Law & Econ. 1466 1374 1432 -2%
Law & Society Review 619 600 803 +20%
Law & Social Inquiry 600 771 754 +26%
Law & Human Behavior 135 244 404 +200%
[median % change] [+ 26%]
lagship journals of selected social sciences
American Economic Rev. 712 777 981 + 38%
Amer. Political Sci. Rev. 269 290 363 + 35%
Amer. Sociological Rev. 212 191 337 + 59%
Psychological Rev. 39 69 238 +519%
[median % change] [+ 49%]
Source: Westlaw'sJLR database. Numbers deflated to account
for changingJLR database size. 1994-1996 = 100.
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TABLE 2
TREND IN NUMBER OF LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
IN WHICH A SELECTED TERM APPEARS
Number Qf Articles Including Term
% change,
1988-90 to
Term 1982-84 1988-90 1994-96 1994-96
"critical legal studies" 716 1,152 871 -24%
"balancing" 13,168 11,361 9,281 -18%
"transactionl costi" 2,429 2,272 2,644 + 16%
"table 1" 1,090 1,154 1,693 + 47%
Source: Westlaw's JLR database. Numbers deflated to
account for changingJRL database size. 1994-96 = 100.
Of the four terms appearing in Table 2, table 1, a proxy for
social-scientific work of a quantitative sort, shows the strongest
growth over time. Between 1988-90 and 1994-96 alone, the
(deflated) number of law review articles including the phrase
table 1 increased by 47%. The upward trend in the appearance of
transaction! cost!, a proxy for law and economics, has been more
gradual and less steady. The other two terms listed in Table 2
have been in sharp decline since 1988-90. Critical legal studies
boomed during the 1980s but has been going bust during the
1990s.7 Balancing, a proxy for a popular middlebrow form of
legal analysis, has trended steadily downward from its heights in
1982-84.
C. SSCI's 1993 Ranking of LawJournals by "Impact Factor"
The Social Sciences Citation Index tallies citations appearing
in over 100 law-related journals and over 1,000 social-science
journals. Unlike JLR data, SSCI data therefore indicate how
often articles published in law-related journals receive
7. Duncan Kennedy, one of the stalwarts of Critical Legal Studies, now asserts that the
CLS movement is "dead." Duncan Kennedy, Remarks at the Yale Legal Theory Workshop
(December 19, 1996). Table 2 suggests that "in sharp decline" would be more accurate.
But ef DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 8-10 (1997) (asserting that CLS
"came apart" as a social movement in the late 1980s, but that it continues to have vitality
as an academic school and a theory of law).
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recognition in the general academic literature. Table S indicates
the SSCI's "impact factor" for selected journals for 1993, the
most recent year for which I obtained data. An impact factor
measures how frequently an average article appearing in a recent
volume of the journal in question is cited in the broad range of
journals included in the SSGI database. Raw counts of journal
citations favor thick journals over thin, and old journals over
young. SSCI developed its impact factor as an attempt to
neutralize these distortions. To an author solely seeking to
maximize citations in leading law and social-scientific journals,
the impact factor would be the most relevant measure ofjournal
quality.
Table 3 includes all of the law-and-social-science journals
whose impact factor was in the top thirty for law reviews in 1993.
Six achieved this exalted status. Each of the six is marked with
an asterisk, and the year of the journal's founding is indicated in
brackets.8 Note that all six are relatively youthful. The sextet
includes three law-and-economics journals and two law-and-
society journals, including the highest ranked of the six, Law &
Social Inquiy, published by the American Bar Foundation.9 Law
and Human Behavior, the fledglingjournal of law and psychology,
also cracked the top thirty in 1993.
Table 3 demonstrates that articles published in law-and-social-
science journals have had significant influence on the larger
academic literature. Indeed, all three tables, taken in the
aggregate, support the thesis that "law-and" work of a social-
scientific stripe not only has established an ample niche for
itself, but also continues to expand its foothold.
8. Because Law & Contemporm Problems is not consistently committed to a social-
scientifc perspective, it is not asterisked.
9. But cfJames Lindgren & Daniel Seltzer, The Most Prolific Law Professors and Facultles,
71 CH.-KINT L. REV. 781, 789 (1996) (offering a more complex SSCI-based ranking of
law reviews, in which theJournal of Legal Studies is the top-ranked of the sextet (in 10th
place overall) and Law & Social Inquigy is in 37th place overall).
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TABLE 3
"IMPACT FACTORS" OF SELECTED LAWJOURNALS, 1993
(listed in order of decreasing rank)
1. Harvard Law Review" 6.730
2. Michigan Law Review 6.027
3. Yale LawJournal 5.529
4. Stanford Law Review 5.143
5. Columbia Law Review 4.049
12. Law& Social Inquiry* [1976]" 2.636
14.Journal of Legal Studies* [1972] 2.378
18. Law & Human Behavior* [1977] 2.125
21. Law & Society Review* [1966] 1.887
28.Journal of Law, Econ. & Organization* [1985] 1.413
29. Indiana LawJournal 1.410
30.Journal of Law & Economics* [1958] 1.364
31. Boston University Law Review 1.306
56. Law & Contemporary Problems 0.614
Source: Institute for Scientific Information, Social Sciences
Citation IndexJournal Citation Reports 44 (1993).
10. During the past decade or two, authors of law-review article1 have been just as likely
to cite the Yale Lawjournal as the Harvard Law Review. See supra Table 1. Table 3 indicates,
however, that in 1993 the Harvard Law Reuiews impact factor was the highest of all the
law journals. It appears that authors of articles published in social-scientific journals
weigh the Harvard signal relatively more favorably than law-review writers do.
11. Originally entitled the Amercan BarFundationResearchJournaL
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II. THE MARKET FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Is the continuing rise of law-and-social-science scholarship to
be welcomed? To tackle the question I apply some basic
principles of microeconomics.'2 These require attention to both
the supply side (the professors and other researchers who
produce legal scholarship) and also the demand side (those who
consume scholarship, directly or vicariously).
Conventional microeconomic analysis assumes that a
supplier's primary form of compensation is money. Money
indeed is one of the important rewards for successful legal
scholarship. All else equal, scholarly success brings a higher
salary, fatter royalty checks, and more consulting opportunities.
However, because most law professors could earn far more in
law practice than they do in law teaching, nonpecuniary
compensation also must play a significant role. I assert,.as others
have, that status rewards are an important currency in the
market for legal scholarship.'3 Like individuals in other social
situations, a legal scholar typically seeks to win enhanced respect
from members of relevant reference groups, especially peers in
an academic specialty.
In a celebrated critique of trends in legal scholarship, Judge
Harry Edwards asserted in 1992 that law professors had become
overly entranced with "abstract theory" and were neglecting to
produce scholarship of practical importance." If translated into
economic language, Judge Edwards's thesis would be that
"imperfections" were causing the market for legal scholarship to
"fail" to maximize welfare. There indeed is a plausible case that
the market for legal scholarship suffers to some degree from
monopoly, externalities, and other conventional market
imperfections.' 5 Nevertheless, I will argue that Judge Edwards
has greatly underestimated the market constraints on the supply
of legal scholarship. In particular, the interests of the
12. A prior and more ambitious venture in this vein is George L Priest, The Growth of
Interdis iplina7y Research and the Industial Structure of Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to
JudgeEdward, 91 MICH. L REV. 1929,1936-42 (1993).
13. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Marketplace ofIdeas, 90 YALE LJ. 1131, 1132-34 (1981)
(noting law professors' pursuit of"fame").
14. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing DiYunction Between Legal Fducation and the Legal
Pmfe'ion, 91 MICH. L REv. 34,34 (1992). The article prompted many responses, notably
those collected in Symposium: Legal Education, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1921, 1921-2219 (1993).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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participants on the demand side of this market are likely to limit
frivolous tendencies of the professors on the supply side.
A. The Supply of Legal Scholarship
Imagine that a cluster of professors was to pioneer a new
approach, law and astrology. A professor's primary costs of
producing this sort of scholarship would include any cash
outlays entailed and (more importantly) the opportunity costs of
the time involved in the work. These supply costs vary from
individual to individual. For example, the migration of doctoral
students from other academic disciplines into law teaching has
shifted outward the supply curve of "law-and" scholarship
connected to those disciplines.
Some academic work is more pleasurable (or arduous) than
others. Because cognitive dissonance is psychically costly, it is
cheaper, all else equal, for a scholar to labor on scholarly works
the conclusions of which will be consistent with the scholar's
preexisting ideology. This helps explain the high incidence of
ideologically driven scholarship. If the scholars in the law-and-
astrology movement were fervently committed ideologues, one
thus might expect them to offer a large amount of this
scholarship at a low price.
The supply side of the market for scholarship, however, has
characteristics that somewhat constrain supplier behavior. First,
scholarly errors, once published, are highly visible. Ideas are
"public goods" in the economic sense that they are not
rivalrously consutaied. A scholar who publishes a law-and-
astrology article cannot prevent critics of law and astrology from
seeing it. Second, a scholar has a strong interest in building a
reputation that will encourage members of his potential
audience-who are increasingly overwhelmed with reading
options-to bother to read the scholar's output. Each
incremental publication affects a scholar's accumulated
reputational stock. Markets therefore punish a scholar who has
published a subpar article in two ways; not only do consumers of
scholarship decline to confer rewards on account of the article,
they also adjust downward the scholar's prior status ranking.
No. 1]
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B. The Demand forLegal Scholarship
Like any other entrepreneur, a scholar rarely can be self-
indulgent enough to ignore demand for alternative outputs. I
distinguish between two sorts of participants on the demand
side: primary consumers-that is, members of the legal
community who are sufficiently expert to appraise the quality of
scholarship; and seconday consumers, most of whom supply
factors in the production of legal services. The essential point is
that secondary consumers derive their demands for legal
scholarship from the tastes of primary consumers.' 6 Although far
more numerous, secondary consumers of legal scholarship
ultimately have less power. If primary consumers can tell good
work from bad, secondary consumers, whose demand is
derivative, will decline to reward self-indulgent scholarship.
1. Primary consumers
Academic peers. The key primary consumers of a scholarly
publication are other scholars who labor in the same vineyard.
These peers can reward a successful author with citations,
conference invitations, and other indicia of professional respect.
As just noted, these primary consumers also provide pivotal
information to secondary consumers.
Scholarly work is intensely competitive. Academic norms
strongly reward innovators who successfully challenge prevailing
paradigms of analysis. American law professors, steeped in the
adversary system ofjustice, may be especially eager to expose the
limitations of prior authors and schools.17 Over time, the
Darwinian struggle among academics tends to weed out
unfruitful scholarly approaches. The process may grind slowly,
of course. Marxism and Freudianism, for example, prospered
for generations before being effectively contested.
Consumers of legal services. Peer review might not halt the
spread of law and astrology if activists in that movement were to
16. On derived demand, see PAULA. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMics 514 (8th ed. 1970).
17. Adherents of any emerging school of "law-and" scholarship must expect to weather
stinging criticism. Notable examples of attacks on rising schools include Daniel A. Farber
& Suzanna Sherry, TellingStories out ofSchook An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV.
807 (1993) (critique of story-telling approaches); PhillipJohnson, Do You Sincerely Want to
be Radical2 , 36 STAN. L. REV. 247 (1984) (critique of Critical Legal Studies); and Arthur
Leff, Eonomic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974)
(critique of Posnerian law and economics).
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succeed in infiltrating many law schools. But a second set of
primary consumers of legal scholarship is not so easily co-opted.
Clients value effective legal services. If law and astrology were to
prove to be an ineffective method of legal analysis, clients would
tend to desert law firms that specialized in that approach. As a
result, those firms would have fewer jobs to offer law school
graduates. In this way, the placement market would signal to law
students that law-and-astrology training was not valued, and
students eager for job opportunities would tend to follow
scholarship and enroll in courses more useful than law and
astrology.
2. Secondary consumers
The secondary consumers of legal scholarship include
members of the media, employers of law school graduates (just
discussed), and many others. Three categories of secondary
consumers situated in academic settings warrant special
discussion.
Universities and other employers of scholars. Largely on account of
student, faculty, and alumni demands, universities seek to hire
scholars of stature. Because knowledge is highly specialized, a
university must rely heavily on members of an academic specialty
to appraise candidates for a faculty position. For instance, a law
school desirous of hiring a professor of bankruptcy law would
derive its demand largely from the tastes of other bankruptcy
scholars, the primary consumers of that scholarship. No doubt,
David Cavers and Lon Fuller received offers from the Harvard
Law School in part because other scholars admired what they
had accomplished with Law and Contemporary Problems.
Mangers of law-related journals. To ease recruitment of
subscribers, authors, and staff, a law journal's editors also must
seek status. To attain it, they must publish articles that appeal to
the primary consumers of scholarship.
Tables 1 & 3, reproduced above, demonstrate that faculty-
edited law journals have won increasing influence during the
late Twentieth Century. Most of these journals circulate
submitted articles for peer review, a system that enhances the
influence of that group of primary consumers.
Student-edited law journals have been somewhat more
susceptible to ephemeral scholarly fashions. Nevertheless,
No. 1]
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student articles editors commonly use the eminence of an
author, or of an author's home institution, as a signal of
scholarly quality. When they do, their demand is derived from
the tastes of others better qualified to appraise the quality of
scholarship. If primary consumers were to conclude that law and
astrology was a frivolous approach, an author of an article in that
-vein would have to anticipate difficulty in winning acceptance
from a high-quality student-edited law review.
Law students. Aside from their role in managing legal journals,
law students are an important and ultimately conservative bloc
of consumers of legal scholarship. First, students exercise a
(weak) form of market discipline when they apply to law schools.
Suppose that a law school were to become known for its stress on
law and astrology, an approach widely perceived within the
profession to be unsound. This negative reputation would
induce some admitted students to enroll elsewhere. Anticipating
that market reaction, law school administrators, all else equal,
would confer lower monetary and status rewards on scholars
producing in the law-and-astrology vein.
Second, and more importantly, law students "vote with their
feet" among the elective courses that law schools offer. With rare
exceptions, law professors aspire to attract students to their
classes and to receive favorable reactions from enrollees. If law
and astrology were to be a loser, a professor who wrote and
taught in that vein would risk loss of status among students.
Student demand for elective courses is to a considerable extent
derived from the demands of potential employers for skills. If
Judge Edwards were to advise clerkship applicants that he
favored students who had studied Administrative Law, his
message would enhance student demand for that course.
Duncan Kennedy's assertion that "Critical Legal Studies is dead"
perhaps reflects a perception that there is scant student demand
for it in the classroom. The conservative character of student
demand for courses and faculty mentors, doubly derived
through employers and clients, is an important safeguard
against frolics and detours in legal scholarship.
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C. Imperfections in the Market for Legal Scholarship
During a prior panel at this Symposium, economist Eric
Rasmusen reviewed the imperfections that may cause a market
to generate less than optimal results.'8 Many of these
imperfections may afflict, to some degree, the market for legal
scholarship.
First, the supply of legal education is not perfectly
competitive. Institutions such as bar associations and the
Association of American Law Schools have striven to cartelize
the education of new lawyers.' In the absence of this cartel, a
standard legal education might consume only two years, not
three. Some observers might argue that the rise of "law-and"
teaching and scholarship is due in part to the existence of a
captive audience of law students during the superfluous third
year. I give that argument little weight. Economic theory
predicts that a cartel would use its power to exact higher prices,
not to lower the quality of service. Competition among academic
approaches to fill out the legal curriculum remains stiff.
Second, externalities may exist in academic markets. For
example, if intellectual property rights do not wholly internalize
the benefits of academic innovations, good ideas may be
undersupplied. This potential problem, of course, is not specific
to "law-and" scholarship, but pervades all intellectual endeavors.
One function of informal status rewards among academics is to
make up for the incompleteness of formal intellectual property
rights.
Third, it might be asserted that some of the groups that
consume legal scholarship, either primarily or secondarily, lack
the intellectual capacity to discipline suppliers of legal
pedagogy. Law students, for example, might be seen as lacking
either the capacity or information to choose among law schools,
law courses, and manuscripts submitted to law reviews. This is
highly dubious. Law students are adults, and have strong
incentives to learn from the grapevines, guidebooks, and rating
services that offer relevant information. For example, the steep
18. SeeEric Rasmusen, OfSex andDrug, andRock',olL'Does Law and Eonomid SupPot
SocialRegulatin?, 21 HARv.J.L. &PUB. PoLY71 (1997).
19. For an introduction, see sources cited in PeterJames Kolovos, Note, Antitutma Law
and Nonj'opfit Organizatios: The Lw SchoolAccreditation Case 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 689-93
(1996).
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decline of Critical Legal Studies! probably has lessened the
allure of the Harvard Law School, strongly associated with LS,
to prospective law students. Similarly, enrolled law students can
mimic the tastes of more sophisticated primary consumers when
selecting courses and accepting manuscripts for publication.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, although the market for legal scholarship is hardly
perfect, I conclude that it works passably well-much better than
Judge Edwards and other critics would have us believe. Analysts
of this market should not focus exclusively on the supply side,
which to be sure includes countless professors inclined to be
self-indulgent. These suppliers face, on the demand side,
sophisticated persons not readily duped. Although some law
school faculties may occasionally succumb to unworthy fashions,
the market tends eventually to punish them for doing so. In the
long run, the most reliable controls on the quality of scholarly
outpiat are the demands of clients who consume legal services,
and the demands of universities for faculty members who
command peer esteem.
In the end, I interpretJudge Edwards's polemic as a signal by
a employer of newly-minted law school graduates about the sorts
of courses he would like to see on a clerkship applicant's
transcript. His article is better seen not as act of repudiation of
the marketplace for legal scholarship, but as an act of
participation in that market.
20. Seesupra note 7 and accompanying text.
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